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Legal Protection to Foreign
Investors
Juan Carlos Hatchondo and Leonardo Martinez
G
overnments have the ability to affect the return of foreign invest-
ments. The typical expropriation is one in which a government uni-
laterally transfers the property right of a ﬁrm without compensating
the previous owners. However, governments can also expropriate through
discriminatory taxation or regulation. For instance, governments can impose
a high differential tax rate on a ﬁrm’s beneﬁts, limit the prices or locations
at which a ﬁrm may sell its products, limit royalty payments, etc. Chifor
(2002) notes that indirect expropriation through taxation and regulation has
supplanted direct takings as the most common type of expropriation. Gov-
ernments can also expropriate by defaulting on their debt. Borensztein and
Panizza(2008)report114defaultepisodesduringthelast30years. Sovereign
defaults have been common in developing countries, though we have ob-
served in 2010 and 2011 a signiﬁcant increase in the perceived probability of
a sovereign default in some European countries.
Governments could resort to expropriations to increase current ﬁscal re-
sources or as a way to avoid implementing unpopular policies that could, for
example, avert a sovereign default. However, expropriations can be costly in
the long run. For instance, expropriations may be followed by lower capital
inﬂows, expropriated ﬁrms may be run less efﬁciently, or expropriations may
distort the behavior of ﬁrms that were not directly affected but fear being so
in the future. When the long-run beneﬁts derived from foreign investment or
from better borrowing terms in international capital markets offset the poten-
tial short-run gains from expropriation, the welfare of domestic households
could be increased by limiting the government’s ability to expropriate foreign
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investors.1 One mechanism that could be used to limit expropriation risk is
to pass national laws that explicitly grant protection to investors. Yet, the fact
that the authorities in charge of enforcing the law are the same ones that may
violate investors’ property rights casts doubt about the degree of protection
that can be offered by local legal systems. Instead, one mechanism that is
used to discipline current and future governments is to reduce the degree of
sovereignty by increasing the government’s exposure to foreign courts. This
second mechanism is the focus of the present article.
One way sovereigns involve foreign courts is by signing international in-
vestment agreements that grant foreign investors the right to settle a dispute
in international arbitration tribunals. Governments have also ratiﬁed interna-
tional conventions that bind them to recognize arbitration tribunals’decisions
concerning investment—and commercial—disputes. As far as the success of
litigatinginvestorsisconcerned, severalauthors(see, forexample, Dolzerand
Stevens [1995]; Reed, Paulsson, and Blackaby [2004]; and Baldwin, Kantor,
and Nolan [2006]) argue that governments have tended to comply with unfa-
vorable rulings in international tribunals. This has been so despite investors’
limited legal means available to enforce reparation payments. The fact that
governments have complied with unfavorable rulings suggests the presence
of other types of costs. For example, ignoring unfavorable rulings may send
a negative signal about the government’s commitment to respect investors’
property rights, which may have adverse aggregate consequences on capital
inﬂows. But the apparent success could also be contaminated by the presence
of sample bias in the set of cases that has been submitted to international
tribunals. Investors who expected difﬁculties in collecting compensation pay-
ments may have decided not to bear the costs of litigation.2 Note also that
investors’ past success in litigations may not be a good predictor of future
success.
International investment agreements were originally designed with the
intent to promote foreign direct investment, but they have gradually adjusted
to extend protection to other types of investment. In part, this may explain the
fact that not all investment agreements explicitly protect holders of sovereign
debt.
In order to protect foreign lenders, governments have increasingly chosen
to issue debt in international ﬁnancial centers such as NewYork. This prac-
tice exposes defaulting governments to litigations in foreign national courts.
1 Some authors have argued that the risk of losing political support could serve as an en-
forcement mechanism that protects domestic residents. Hatchondo and Martinez (2010) present a
survey on the politics of sovereign defaults.
2A country that anticipates an unfavorable tribunal decision could also withdraw from an
international investment agreement. Bolivia did so in 2007, shortly after a Dutch-based subsidiary
of Telecom Italia ﬁled a claim seeking arbitration in an alleged case of expropriation of a telecom-
munications investment.J. C. Hatchondo and L. Martinez: Legal Protection to Foreign Investors 177
Holdersofbondsindefaultthatwereissuedinforeigncountriescanenforcere-
payment in courts by diverting some type of sovereign assets located outside
the defaulting country. However, defaulting governments have, in general,
succeeded in locating those assets outside the reach of creditors. It should be
mentioned that even when holders of debt in default do not succeed in collect-
ing payments, they may be imposing a cost to the defaulting sovereign. This
occurs because, in order to keep their assets outside the reach of creditors,
governments in default may not be able to issue debt in international ﬁnancial
markets.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses inter-
national investment agreements. Section 2 discusses the protection granted




ments grant to a broad class of foreign investments. The typical investment
agreement takes the form of a reciprocal bilateral investment treaty in which
two countries agree on a set of conditions under which the nationals of one
country may seek compensation if their investments in the other country are
affected. There are also a few multilateral investment agreements, like Chap-
ter11oftheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreementbetweenCanada,Mexico,
and the United States.
It should be mentioned that international investment agreements do al-
low for states to expropriate foreign investors under certain circumstances,
namely that the expropriation is done for a public purpose, in accordance with
the law, in a nondiscriminatory manner, and after paying a prompt and ad-
equate compensation to the property owner (see Dolzer and Stevens [1995]
and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [2004]). The
exact description of the conditions under which investors are granted the right
to request compensation varies across treaties.
International investment agreements specify the arbitration rules that in-
vestors and governments can follow to settle disputes. The most common
arbitration rules are speciﬁed by the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL).3 In what follows, we describe how these
arbitrationrulesworkandtheenforcementmechanismsavailabletoinvestors.
3According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2009),
of the 317 investor-state disputes outstanding in international tribunals, 201 had been ﬁled under
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Arbitration under ICSID Rules
TheICSIDwasestablishedin1965undertheICSIDConvention.4 TheICSID
ConventionwassponsoredbytheWorldBankwiththeobjectiveofpromoting
the ﬂow of foreign direct investments; by the end of 2010, it had been ratiﬁed
by 157 countries. Countries that ratify the Convention agree to abide by
the ICSID arbitration rules, including the enforcement of the decisions of
its tribunals. Reed, Paulsson, and Blackaby (2004) and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2009) have noted that the
increase in the number of bilateral investment agreements observed in the last
two decades has been accompanied by a parallel increase in the number of
arbitrations conducted under ICSID rules.
The ICSID, which is one of the ﬁve organizations that make up the
World Bank group, provides facilities for the resolution of investment dis-
putes through conciliation or arbitration. For instance, it assists in the con-
stitution of tribunals, it administers the funds necessary to cover the costs of
the proceedings, it produces publications to contribute to the understanding of
international investment laws, etc. The ICSID is not in charge of conducting
arbitration proceedings.
With respect to the enforcement of arbitration tribunals’decisions,Article
54oftheICSIDConventionstatesthatﬁnaldecisionsofICSIDtribunalsmust
be considered equivalent to “ﬁnal judgments” of local courts in countries that
have signed the ICSID Convention.5 Baldwin, Kantor, and Nolan (2006)
point out that this clause may not necessarily imply that ﬁnal decisions of
ICSIDtribunalscannotbechallengedinlocalcourtsbecauseinsomecountries
the legal system allows, under some circumstances, for challenges to local
equivalents of ﬁnal judgments. In fact, Baldwin, Kantor, and Nolan (2006)
review four cases in which ICSID rulings were challenged in local courts.
Even though some received favorable judgments in lower courts, eventually
allchallengeswereunsuccessful. AnotherimportantimplicationofArticle54
of the ICSID Convention is that ﬁnal decisions of ICSID tribunals not only
bind in the country that hosted the expropriated investment, but also in all
countries that have signed the Convention.6 This implies that investors could
seek reparation in any country that has signed the Convention and not only
4 Convention refers to an agreement among countries that establishes obligations to the coun-
tries that ratify it.
5Article 54(1) of the Convention states that: “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an
award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations im-
posed by that award within its territories as if it were a ﬁnal judgment of a court in that State. A
Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal
courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a ﬁnal judgment of
the courts of a constituent state.”
6As a clariﬁcation, Reed, Paulsson, and Blackaby (2004) point out that “...[i]n the context
of ICSID arbitration, enforcement is generally indistinguishable from recognition. The two terms
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in the country where the expropriation took place. However, Reed, Paulsson,
and Blackaby (2004) and Baldwin, Kantor, and Nolan (2006) note that it is
assumed that under the ICSID Convention, signatory states shall enforce the
judgments according to their own national law, which has two implications.
First,sovereignimmunitylawsprotect(some)governmentassetsfromforeign
investors when investors attempt to seize government assets in jurisdictions
different from the one in which the expropriation took place.7 Second, the
Conventiondoesnotobligateasignatorycountrytoenforcethecompensation
ofinvestorsafterafavorablearbitrationdecisionifthelocallawdoesnotallow
enforcement of compensation of equivalent local court judgments.
Baldwin, Kantor, and Nolan (2006) discuss that if a government refuses
to honor a tribunal’s decision, the affected investor could resort to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (the primary judicial body of the United Nations). But
this alternative also presents its own difﬁculties. First, the International Court
of Justice only accepts disputes between two states, which means that the af-
fected investor should request its government to sponsor such a claim. There
are political and economic reasons why government authorities may decide
not to sponsor claims of individual investors against another state. Second, it
is unclear that the International Court of Justice will accept jurisdiction over
the dispute without a consent of the government that refused to honor the ar-
bitration tribunal’s decision. Third, even in the case of a favorable decision
in the International Court of Justice, the means to collect the payments are
limited. Potentially, a state could take the issue before the Security Council,
but it is highly unlikely that the Security Council would decide to enforce
the claims.
The previous discussion suggests that the actual legal protection enjoyed
by investors is somewhat limited. Despite that, Dolzer and Stevens (1995);
Reed,Paulsson,andBlackaby(2004);andBaldwin,Kantor,andNolan(2006)
state that, with a few exceptions, governments have complied with ICSID tri-
bunals’decisions. Besides,onsomeoccasions,thepartiesreachedasettlement
before a ﬁnal decision was made and, on other occasions, before a case was
submitted for arbitration. The authors above argue that there may be various
reasons why governments comply. First, it could be that countries that have
ratiﬁed the Convention are the ones that try to attract foreign investments and
backing out of honoring the decisions of arbitration tribunals may discour-
age future investors. That said, the tradeoffs or preferences of government
up to, but stopping short of, actual execution of an award.” This meaning is different from the
meaning that the term enforcement is typically assigned in economics.
7 For instance, the French company Liberian Easter Timber Corporation (LETCO) obtained
in 1986 an arbitration against Liberia for breach of a forestry concession. LETCO ﬁrst tried in a
New York court to obtain the right to seize registration fees and taxes owed to the government of
Liberia, but the court ruled against LETCO based on the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Later LETCO tried in a court in Washington, D.C., to obtain the right to seize bank accounts of
the Liberian Embassy in the United States and the court also ruled against LETCO.180 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
authorities that were in ofﬁce when the country ratiﬁed the Convention may
differ from the ones of government authorities that are supposed to enforce
an unfavorable arbitration decision, and from the ones of future governments.
Second, given that the ICSID is part of the World Bank, it may be expected
that the World Bank could withhold beneﬁts—like extending new loans—to
countries that refuse to comply.
Arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules
The UNCITRAL was established in 1966 by the United Nations with the ob-
jective to help harmonize and unify the law of international trade. Since then,
the UNCITRAL has prepared several conventions, model laws, and other in-
struments related to laws of trade transactions. Among the contributions that
UNCITRAL has developed are rules for arbitration of commercial disputes
(see UNCTAD [2003]), which were designed to offer a well-speciﬁed in-
ternational arbitration procedure that could be used in a variety of disputes,
including disputes concerning the expropriation of foreign investments.
The enforcement of an arbitration tribunal decision that acted according
to the UNCITRAL rules depends on the conventions ratiﬁed by the coun-
tries of the parties in dispute. The most common instrument governing the
enforcement of international arbitrations is the United Nations Convention
on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, also
known as the NewYork Convention. The NewYork Convention, which had
been ratiﬁed by 145 countries by the end of 2010, requires that the states that
have ratiﬁed it recognize and enforce international arbitration agreements and
foreign arbitral decisions issued in other contracting states, subject to certain
exceptions. Thismeansthattwopartiescandecidetolocatetheirdisputesina
third, neutral country, knowing that the tribunal’s decision can be enforced in
any country that has adhered to the Convention. There are also regional con-
ventions, like the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, that can be invoked to pursue the enforcement of international
arbitration decisions. Reed, Paulsson, and Blackaby (2004) argue that tri-
bunals’decisions enforced under the ICSID Convention are more favorable to
recognitionthantheonesenforcedundertheNewYorkConventionorregional
conventions, as the latter allow for challenges in local courts under more cir-
cumstances than do the former. The enforcement limitations described for the
case of the ICSID Convention also apply to the New York Convention and
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2. SOVEREIGN DEBT
This section reviews the legal protection enjoyed by holders of debt in de-
fault.8 Holders of sovereign bonds issued in New York, London, or other
ﬁnancial centers can resort to courts in those jurisdictions in order to enforce
repayment (subject to certain conditions such as the majority enforcement
provision in collective action clauses). That said, the bondholders’ ability to
enforce courts’rulings is uncertain and the absence of a well-speciﬁed inter-
national bankruptcy procedure and successive law changes have generated a
signiﬁcantdegreeofheterogeneityinthesuccessoflitigationsofholdersofde-
faulted sovereign bonds (see Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer [2009]
and the references therein). The discussion below describes that, de facto,
bondholders’ ability to enforce debt repayment through the judicial system
has been quite limited.
Buchheit (1995) explains that, until the ﬁrst half of the twentieth cen-
tury, most countries (including the United States) recognized an “absolute”
theory of sovereign immunity, which implied that sovereigns could not be
sued in foreign courts without their consent. The United States began to rec-
ognize a “restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity in 1952, which limited
sovereigns’immunity for commercial activities carried on outside sovereigns’
territories. This principle turned into law in 1976 with the approval of the
Foreign Sovereign ImmunitiesAct. That law speciﬁes that sovereigns can be
judgedinU.S.courtsfortheircommercialcontractssignedwithforeigncoun-
terparties, and several court decisions have conﬁrmed that bond issuances in
U.S. markets are to be considered commercial activities. A similar law was
approved in the United Kingdom in 1978 (the State ImmunityAct), and most
countries now have similar laws (see Buchheit [1995]).9
In spite of the more limited sovereign immunity, creditors who tried to
collect sovereign debt through judicial systems experienced mixed results
(see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer [2006] and Panizza, Sturzenegger, and
Zettelmeyer [2009]). This casts doubt on the degree of protection granted by
issuing debt in developed countries. The challenge that litigators face is not
so much to obtain judgments against a sovereign debtor but to enforce that
judgment. Forinstance,theForeignSovereignImmunitiesActgrantscreditors
the right to seize sovereigns’ property in the United States though litigators
8 The anonymity of bondholders limits governments’ ability to default only on foreigners. In
contrast, it may be easier for governments to target foreign ﬁrms for expropriation, especially in
developing countries with underdeveloped stock markets.
9 The legal protection granted to debtors was raised by Bulow and Rogoff (1990) as a po-
tential source of the excessive borrowing that led to the debt crisis of the 1980s. As a result,
Bulow and Rogoff (1990) propose to augment sovereign immunity for debt liabilities. This would
also induce governments in developing countries to improve domestic institutions that determine
the enforceability of contracts or the accountability of government authorities. They argue that
those reforms would enable developing countries to attract foreign capital ﬂows while also helping
incoming capital ﬂows to be allocated to better projects.182 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
can only seize property that “is or was used for the commercial activity upon
which the claim is based” (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976). Given
that sovereigns usually do not need to use any of their property located in the
United States to issue debt, and that the ﬁnancial assets obtained at the time of
the bond issuances are no longer located in the United States, the repayment
that creditors may expect to obtain through that route is minimal. Creditors
have also tried to attach international reserves of the country in default but
with limited success (see Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer [2009]). Of
course, asovereignwouldonlychoosetodefaultwhentherearenosigniﬁcant
assets investors could attach.
One of the most prominent cases in which creditors were able to induce
repayment was that of Elliott Associates, L.P., v. Banco de la Nacion and
the Republic of Peru.10 In 1996 the “vulture fund” Elliott purchased, in the
secondary market, loans that had been extended to Banco de la Nacion and
Banco Popular del Peru and that had been guaranteed by the Peruvian gov-
ernment.11 The loans were bought for $11.4 million and had a face value of
$20.7 million. Those bonds were part of government debt that was scheduled
to be included in the Brady Plan restructuring. The Brady restructuring agree-
ment was ﬁnalized in March 1997, and was accompanied by a promise not
to provide any preferential treatment to creditors who had not participated in
theagreement. Forthatreason, PeruvianauthoritiesrefusedElliott’sdemands
for full repayment. Elliott started litigations in a NewYork court. In 2000, it
obtained authorization to recover $55.7 million from the government of Peru
for the principal and past due interests up to such date and post-judgment
interest. Even though Elliott did not manage to conﬁscate property belonging
to Peru’s government, it obtained a court authorization to intercept and attach
theﬁrstpaymentthatPeru’sgovernmentwasabouttomakethroughtheChase
Manhattan Bank in NewYork to creditors who had participated in the Brady
restructuring agreement. Elliott was also able to obtain enforcement orders
from courts in Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada. In
response to that, Peru’s government decided to channel the Brady bonds pay-
ment through Euroclear: a ﬁnancial company that operates in Brussels and
that provides domestic and international securities services. Elliott succeeded
inconvincingtheBrusselsCourtofAppealstosuspendthosepayments. After
that, Peru’s government decided to settle by paying Elliott $58.4 million and
not risk defaulting on its new debt by not being able to pay on time creditors
who had participated in the restructuring agreement. Defaulting on Brady
10 See Gulati and Klee (2001), Nolan (2001), and Singh (2003).
11A vulture fund typically refers to an investment company that purchases debt claims in
secondary markets at a relatively large discount because the debtor has defaulted or there is a high
chance of default. In the event of a default, these investors have the legal expertise to litigate
and are willing to hold those debt claims for many years until they reach a settlement with the
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bonds would have triggered the right of all Brady bondholders to demand full
repayment of their securities at that time. Ex-post, Elliott made a return of
around 400 percent in four years for that investment (without including legal
fees).
Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009) note that, for several rea-
sons, the success of Elliott’s strategy proved to be more of an exception than a
rule. First, thelegalargumentusedbyElliottwasweakandreliedonacontro-
versial interpretation of the pari passu clause (see Gulati and Klee [2001]).12
The argument presented by Elliott at the Brussels Court of Appeals was that
Peru’s government was trying to use Euroclear to violate the right of equal
treatment of creditors, and that right was entitled to Elliott since the loans it
owned contained the pari passu clause. That interpretation of the pari passu
clausewasrejectedincourtsinseveralsubsequentlitigations. Second,thelaw
changedtoavoidothercaseslikeElliottv. Peru. Forinstance,Belgiumpassed
a law that tries to prevent creditors from obtaining court orders that could in-
terceptpaymentsfromasovereigntoitsbondholders. Third, sovereignscould
move preemptively by settling payments within their legal jurisdiction or by
using the Bank of International Settlements, which would prevent litigators
from intercepting those payments.
One notorious case in which holders of debt in default have not been
able to induce repayment through the judicial system is the 2001 Argentine
default. For bonds issued in Argentina, the government decided in 2002 to
change the currency of denomination (from U.S. dollars toArgentine pesos).
The pesiﬁcation of government debt was done using an exchange rate below
its market value and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) estimate a mean
recovery rate of 64 percent across bonds. For debt issued in foreign countries,
the Argentine government proposed in 2004 to exchange those bonds with
three new securities from which bondholders could choose. The exchange
took place in 2005 with a participation rate of 76 percent and with a recovery
rate ranging between 25 percent and 29 percent, according to Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2005). In addition, the Argentine government passed a law
that forbids the executive branch from negotiating with creditors who do not
participate in the exchange and from incurring in transactions with bondhold-
ers arising from any court order. In spite of that, some creditors who did not
participate in the exchange (holdouts) litigated in the United States and other
developed countries’courts. They managed to obtain judgment orders against
Argentina’s assets but they have not succeeded in conﬁscating assets. It must
be said that the limited success of bondholders does not necessarily mean that
the litigation process has been costless for Argentina. Holdouts may have
12 Many sovereign bonds include a pari passu clause that states that bondholders rank equally
in priority of payments. The clause limits the ability of sovereigns to dilute past claims by issuing
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barred Argentina from international capital markets because the government
may be unable to receive the proceeds of bond issuances before holdouts are
paid off. That may have motivated Argentine authorities to open up negotia-
tions with holdouts in 2010, after Congress passed a law interrupting, for one
year, the ban to negotiate with holdouts.
Intermsoftheimplicationsforthefuture, BuchheitandGulati(2010)and
others note that there has been an increased use of collective action clauses
in sovereign bond contracts in recent years.13 This may curb the ability of
bondholders to hold out and not accept the terms of restructuring agreements
with the hope that they may obtain a better deal after litigating. In addition
to that, Buchheit and Gulati (2010) mention that legislative initiatives have
been considered in the United States, United Kingdom, and other developed
countries to reduce “vulture creditor activity.” These developments may fa-
cilitate debt restructuring processes, but if that makes defaults and subsequent
renegotiationslesscostly, itmaydeterioratethetermsatwhichsovereignscan
borrow.
InternationalArbitration and Sovereign Debt
Areholdersofsovereigndebtindefaultentitledtoseekreparationinarbitration
tribunals? Grifﬁn and Farren (2005) and Cross (2006) argue that a higher
recovery may be expected after arbitration in an ICSID tribunal than after
litigation in a national court located in the country where the bonds were
originally issued. This statement is partially based on the fact that countries
have complied with ICSID rulings. In addition, resorting to the ICSID may
be more efﬁcient given that its decisions are equivalent to ﬁnal judgments in
all ICSID member states, whereas national court judgments must be validated
in other countries.
In line with this reasoning, in 2006 a group of 170,000 Italian holders
of Argentine defaulted debt requested arbitration under the ICSID Conven-
tion,invokingthebilateralinvestmentagreementbetweenItalyandArgentina.
This request was followed by similar requests of two other groups of Italian
bondholders. These cases are still pending and some experts believe that it
is unlikely that the arbitration tribunal will accept jurisdiction (see Waibel
[2007]). Litigations in ICSID tribunals might become a more widespread
strategy in coming years if ICSID tribunals’ rulings enable bondholders to
recover a higher fraction of their claims.
13 Collective action clauses specify that if a certain percentage of bondholders agree on a
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3. CONCLUSIONS
This article illustrates that foreign investors enjoy legal protection, but this
protection is imperfect. Several analysts argue that governments have tended
to comply with unfavorable rulings of international arbitration courts. This
mayalsobeconsistentwiththefactthatsovereigndefaultepisodesobservedin
recentyearswerefollowedbyrelativelyfriendlydebtrestructuringagreements
(see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer [2005]). The case of Argentina has been
more exceptional and illustrates the limited legal protection available when a
sovereign debtor decides not to repay bondholders who did not participate in
the debt restructuring agreement.14
Thefactthatexpropriatedinvestorsmayhavedifﬁcultiesinbeingrepaired
does not mean that there are no costs associated with ignoring foreign court
or tribunal decisions. For instance, the absence of Argentine sovereign debt
issuances in ﬁnancial centers—because of the risk that bondholders ofArgen-
tine debt in default may divert the receipts from those issuances—may have
imposed a cost to theArgentine government. However, it is unclear how sig-
niﬁcant that cost may be. In the case of investment disputes, a potential cost
of not complying with unfavorable rulings is that it may send a negative sig-
nal about the government’s commitment to respect investors’property rights,
which may have aggregate negative effects on capital inﬂows.
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